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A STATUTORY RIGHT TO TREATMENT FOR
PRISONERS: SOCIETY'S RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
I. THE FAILURE OF CORRECTIONS TO CORRECT
Virtually no one is immune from the results of crime in a free
society. A recent study conducted in high crime areas of two large
cities revealed that forty-three percent of those interviewed said
they stay off streets at night because of their fear of crime. Twenty
percent said they would like to move to another neighborhood be-
cause of their fear of crime. Slightly more than one-third of a
representative sample of all Americans said they keep firearms in
their homes for protection against criminals.' Approximately one
and one quarter million people are incarcerated in state and local
correctional agencies and institutions on any given day,2 and be-
tween sixty and seventy percent of the inmate population are
young people between the ages of fourteen and thirty3 The vast
majority of criminal offenders are not hardened professional crim-
inals. Most offenders are vocationally incompetent and significantly
limited in education. 4 For these offenders the principal feature of
a criminal career is that it is open to anyone irrespective of conven-
tional occupational skills. The recognized task of any correctional
system should be the transfer of the criminal careerist to the pur-
suit of a conventional career.5 The reaction to the desperate need
of both society and criminal offenders for rehabilitative treatment
has been the systematic caging and warehousing of prisoners only
to release them later upon society outraged but not reformed. A
Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Pre-
vention of Violence states:
Because of shortages of trained personnel and suitable facilities,
prisons in this country have never adequately performed their cor-
rectional functions. A look back at the old-times in comparison with
the new times reveals that prisons are substantially unchanged in-
sofar as they still serve as little more than cages with time locks on
their doors.6
1 PRESIDENT'S ConvaIssiox ON LAW ENFoRcEMENT AND THE ArnqsTRA-
TION OF JusTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY V (1967).
2 PRESIDENT'S COivISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADmNIsTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FoRcE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 192 (1967).
3 Conrad, Program Trends in Correctional Rehabilitation in RESEARCH IN
CORRECTIONAL REHABILITATION 6 (1967).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 7.
6 J. CAMPBELL, J. SAHID, & D. STANG, LAw AND ORDER RECONSIDERED 572
(1969).
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One hundred years ago the framers of the Declaration of Principles
of the American Prison Association stated that rehabilitation and
moral regeneration of prisoners and not the infliction of vindictive
suffering were the proper aims of corrections. 7 Nearly one century
later a distinguished psychiatrist and expert penologist stated:
Reformation of the individual is still not the purpose of our system.
The infliction of vindictive suffering still has not been repudiated.
The prisoner still has little to do with his destiny, and can scarcely
imagine that he does have. Prison discipline, far from gaining any-
one's good will or conserving anyone's self-respect, still tends to do
just the opposite. And a prison whose primary aim is to make of-
fenders into "industrious, free men rather than orderly and obedi-
ent prisoners" is yet to be born!8
It is difficult to ascertain why we confine men for years without
any concerted attempt to arrest the forces within them which
placed them in our criminal institutions, all the while professing
in literature and legislation a profound concern for their treatment
and well being. We have seen fit to delegate unlimited discretion
to prison administrators, insulate them from judicial review,9 and
ratify by silence incredible deprivations of liberty under the guise
of discipline.10 This unsupervised delegation of authority is made
all the more dangerous by the fact that it is for the most part exer-
cised in secret. At least two writers have suggested that this vast
exercise of discretion over the lives and human rights of individ-
uals makes prison life as it exists today unconstitutional." It is
society, however, even more than the prisoner, who suffers the con-
sequences of the broad discretion vested in prison administrators
to decide whether the individual deserves treatment or segregation,
rehabilitative opportunity or solitary coninement. These decisions
7 TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY AND RE-
FORMATORY DisciPiINE 541 (Principle II) (1871).
8 K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 220 (1968).
9 Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal
to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). But see
Kutak, From the Outside Looking in: Grim Fairy Tales for Prison Ad-
ministrators in OuTSriE LOOKING IN 37 (1970).
10 Sweeney v. Woodhall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952) (prisoner allegedly beaten
with nine pound strap with five metal prongs; held: prisoner must
exhaust state remedies); Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D.
Md. 1966) (prisoner placed in solitary naked, without blanket or
mattress, in 40 degree temperature for 27 hours then denied bath or
toiletry articles for 16 days; held: deprivations were not of constitu-
tional dimension). See also United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen,
237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956); Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir.
1948); Ruark v. Schooley, 211 F. Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1962); Blyth v.
Ellis, 194 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
31 Hirschkop & Milleman, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55
VA. L. Rsv. 795 (1969).
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are being made every day by virtually anyone in authority who
comes into contact with the prisoner, from the warden on down to
the individual guard. Because these decisions can be made in secret,
prison administrators enjoy an immunity from criticism unmatched
by officials in any other institutional framework.12 The proponent
of law and order as well as the civil libertarian should be concerned
about the administrator's ability to deny rehabilitative opportunity.
It is society who must deal with the criminal offender after his re-
lease without treatment. It is society who must demand that prison-
ers be rehabilitated rather than abused and who must select re-
formation as the goal of corrections rather than retributive punish-
ment. It is with an awareness of society's right of self-defense that
we must review the utility of a statutory right to treatment for
prison inmates.
Ii. THE EVOLVING RIGHT TO TREATAENT
A. Tim MENTALLY ILL
The right to treatment was first proposed as a solution to the
problem of the inadequate treatment afforded the mentally ill..3
It was suggested that incarceration by the state in a mental hospital
in the absence of proper treatment constituted a deprivation of
liberty without due process of law.1 4 The assertion that the mentally
ill were being denied due process of law appeared to rest on pro-
cedural grounds. Without treatment there was very little to differ-
entiate the custody and confinement of a mentally ill person from
that of a person channeled through the criminal justice system. If
the result of the different type of proceedings was the same then
the same procedural safeguards should be employed. It is apparent,
however, that the denial of due process is more substantive in na-
ture. The commitment of a mentally ill person, whether through
civil proceedings or through criminal proceedings after an acquittal
based on insanity, is not unconstitutional because of any error or
lack of safeguards in the proceedings. The very basis of the attack
is that the confinement itself is illegal and not the proceedings
which placed the person in confinement. It has been suggested that
the denial of due process stemmed from the state's assumption of
2 "[lit is inconsistent with our whole system of government to grant
such uncontrolled power to any official, particularly over the lives of
persons. The fact that a person has been convicted of a crime should
not mean that he has forfeited all rights to demand that he be fairly
treated by officials." PsEsmnENT's CommsiSoN ON LAw ENFORCEMINT
AND THE ADtnJSTRATroN or Jusic., TASk FORcE REPORT: CoP.REcroNs
83 (1967).
13 Birnbanum, The Right To Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
14 Id. at 503.
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the role of parens patriae and its subsequent failure to fulfill it.' 5
A more plausible reason would seem to be that the sole basis for
placing an insane person in a mental institution rather than some
other place of detention was the expectation that he would receive
treatment which would eventually enable him to rejoin society.
Failure to provide adequate treatment embodied a fundamental
unfairness prohibited by the Due Process Clause.
The question of whether the right to treatment for the mentally
ill was based on procedural or substantive constitutional rights has
been for the most part mooted with the discovery of much clearer
directives for treatment based on statutory law. The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia in Rouse v. Cameron'5 was the
first court to authorize a remedy based on a statutory right to
treatment. Charles Rouse had been found not guilty by reason of
insanity of carrying a dangerous weapon, a misdemeanor for which
the maximum imprisonment was one year. He was mandatorily
committed pursuant to statute and four years later petitioned for
habeas corpus on the grounds that he had received no psychiatric
treatment. The court stated that failure to provide treatment raised
serious questions of due process of law,' 7 but chose to base its de-
cision on the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act for the
District of Columbia which provides: "A person hospitalized in a
public hospital for a mental illness shall, during his hospitalization,
be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment . . .,IS
The court stated that the right to treatment was cognizable in
habeas corpus and remanded the case to determine if treatment
was in fact being afforded. The right to treatment has been utilized
several times since then to test adequacy of treatment.19 The right
to treatment has been held to apply to civilly committed as well
as criminally insane persons.2 0 Perhaps the most significant aspect
of the Rouse decision is the remedial basis of the opinion. The court
stated that continuing failure to provide suitable and adequate
15 Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967).
See also Symposium-The Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L. J. 673 (1969);
Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77
YALE L. J. 87 (1967).
16 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). On appeal from remand Rouse was
ordered released on other grounds. Rouse v. Cameron, 387 F.2d 241
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
17 373 F.2d at 453.
18 D. C. CODE ENCYCL. Awx. § 21-562 (1967).
19 E.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dobson v.
Cameron, 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
20 Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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treatment could not be justified by lack of staff or facilities. 21 The
right to treatment was clearly a present right and not a matter of
administrative grace. Although the right to treatment in Rouse was
statutory in nature, a right to treatment for a person committed
as incompetent to stand trial has been based on constitutional
grounds. 22
B. SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHS
In Millard v. Cameron,23 the companion case to the Rouse deci-
sion, the court extended the right to treatment to persons committed
as sexual psychopaths. Despite the fact that sexual psychopath
statutes generally provide for indefinite commitment after only a
civil proceeding they have almost universally been held constitu-
tional.24 Invariably, however, it has been held that constitutionality
depends on the fact of adequate treatment.25 In Millard the court
held that lack of treatment destroyed any reason for "differential
treatment" and repeated the declaration of Rouse that lack of treat-
ment could not be justified by lack of staff or facilities. As in Rouse,
the court remanded the habeas corpus petition to the district court
to determine if adequate treatment was in fact being provided. Both
the cases involving the mentally ill and those concerning sexual
psychopaths stress the fact that the absence of treatment destroys
all justification for differential treatment.2 6 This appears to be an
objection to lack of treatment based on the proposition that it is a
denial of equal protection of the law. However, the obvious fact
is that neither the mentally ill person nor the sexual psychopath
could ever be confined in the same manner as a normal person. The
mentally ill are not criminally culpable as are criminal offenders
and therefore the theory of punishment as a deterrent to crime does
not apply to them. Comparisons to the treatment afforded prisoners
are not practical since the reasons for confinement are not the same.
The basis for confinement of the mentally ill is either isolation or
21 373 F.2d at 457. The court reached this conclusion because the lang-
uage which originally limited the right to treatment to the extent
that facilities, equipment, and personnel were available was omitted
from the final draft of the Act.
2 Nason v. Sup't of Bridgewater State Hospital, 353 Mass. 604, 233
N.E.2d 908 (1968).
23 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
24 Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940);
Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Malone v. Over-
holser, 93 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1950); In re Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d
215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951); People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d
18 (1942). See also Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 350 (1952).
25 Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959); In re
Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958).
26 Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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treatment. Both are primarily based on the protection of society.
The courts in the cases upholding a right to treatment have rejected
the idea that mere isolation without treatment justifies confine-
ment; therefore, the theory behind the right to treatment must be
two-fold. First, the individual has a right to be treated fairly once he
is found to be mentally ill, and secondly, society has created a right
of self-defense through commitment statutes providing for adequate
treatment. A violation of the individual's right to treatment also
violates society's right of self-defense.
C. JUVENns
A statutory right to treatment has also been found to exist for
juveniles. In Creek v. Stone27 the court found that a juvenile de-
linquent arrested for robbery but held at a receiving home pending
trial was entitled to adequate treatment in the form of psychiatric
care and that failure to provide adequate care vitiated the justifica-
tion for confinement. In another case in the same jurisdiction the
court held that a juvenile who was found to be habitually truant
and beyond the control of his mother could not be detained by the
Department of Public Welfare unless adequate treatment was af-
forded him.28 In both cases the right to treatment was held to be
cognizable in habeas corpus. Once again the basis of the right was
broad statutory language: "[W]hen the child is removed from his
own family, the court shall secure for him custody, care, and disci-
pline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have
been given him by his parents. '29 Since the purpose of juvenile
detention was to provide the atmosphere the juvenile should have
had at home, failure to provide such care violated Congressional in-
tent in passing the statute and amounted to illegal confinement. The
cases involving the right to treatment for juveniles have been cited
with apparent approval by the United States Supreme Court.30
1. DEFECTIVE DELINQUENTS
The state of Maryland has long recognized that the interests of
-society are best served by rehabilitation of offenders who demon-
strate a danger to society. The Defective Delinquent Act of Mary-
land provides for indefinite confinement after a civil proceeding
for a person who:
by the demonstration of persistent aggravated anti-social or crim-
inal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and
27 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
28 In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
29 D. C. CODE ENcYcL. ANN. § 16-2316 (3) (1966).
30 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23 n.30 (1966).
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who is found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emo-
tional unbalance, or both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual
danger to society so as to require such confinement and treatment,
when' appropriate, as may make it reasonably safe for society to
terminate the confinement and treatment.3 '
The broad character of the definition of the defective delinquent
is matched by the breadth of the list of offenses for which one may
be subjected to a delinquency proceeding. It includes (1) felonies;
(2) serious misdemeanors; (3) crimes of violence; (4) certain sex.
crimes; and (5) two or more convictions for any offenses or crimes
punishable by imprisonment.V 2 In Sas v. Maryland33 several inmates
confined under the act challenged its constitutionality and also as-
serted that no treatment was being provided. The court held the
statute constitutional on its face, but in remanding the case for
further consideration suggested that failure to provide treatment
would deny those confined under the act equal protection of the
law as compared to other law breakers who are convicted of the
same crime but not indefinitely confined.34 Actually the indefinite
sentence could be looked at as merely a more severe sentence
equally applicable to all multiple offenders. In this-light the statute
would appear similar to almost any habitual criminal statute. More,
probably the objection should be that an indeterminate sentence
where no treatment is afforded constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The court stated that deficiencies in staff, facilities, and fi-
nances would undermine the justification for the law and the con-
stitutionality of its application 5
The decision in Sas is a key to whether the right to treatment
should be extended to all prisoners. In Sas the individuals singled
out for rehabilitative treatment were not suffering from mental
peculiarities which would differentiate them from the normal prison
population as are the mentally ill and sexual psychopaths. The
classification was not based on age as is the case with juveniles.
The only real criteria used to distinguish the defective delinquent
were his emotional unbalance and his dangerousness to society.
The act was broad enough to encompass virtually every offense
normally punishable by imprisonment. In fact many of those pro-
ceeded against as delinquents were youthful offenders for crimes
31 MD. AN. CODE art. 31B, § 5 (1957).
32 Id. § 6.
8 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
84 Id. at 509. Contra, Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 44, 246 A.2d
356 (1968) (no constitutional requirement of treatment).
35 334 F.2d at 517. It was later held by the Maryland Supreme Court
that under present medical standards treatment was in fact being
provided. Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221
A.2d 397 (1966).
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against property. 6 The act itself expressly states that treatment is
to terminate only when release would be safe for society. The right
to treatment of defective delinquents applies to the fully culpable
offender who does not suffer from any handicap of mental illness
or age. The protection of society which is the announced goal can
only be accomplished by isolation of the offender from society or
by his reformation. The statute, however, states that treatment is
to be provided. Since the statute has been interpreted to provide
that treatment and not isolation of multiple offenders was what the
legislature intended, it would seem probable that treatment and
not mere isolation or punishment would likewise be preferred in
the confinement and correction of all prisoners.
III. THE BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT
The statutes under which a right to treatment has been found
to exist for the mentally ill, sexual psychopaths, and juveniles
share two common denominators. Embodied in all of the statutes
is a recognition that the purpose of confinement is rehabilitation.
A second common factor is broad statutory language which states
a duty to treat or which states a legislative purpose from which
such a duty may be implied. Similar language can be found in the
statutes of almost every state, usually in the statute which author-
izes the existence of the prison system. One of the clearest examples
of language which would support a right to treatment is expressed
in a Delaware statute:
A Department of Correction is established to provide for the treat-
ment, rehabilitation and restoration of offenders as useful, law
abiding citizens within the community .... These institutions and
services shall be diversified in program, construction and staff to
provide effectively and efficiently for the maximum study, care,
custody, training, and supervision and treatment of those persons
committed to the institutional facilities or on probation or parole,
so that they may be prepared for release, aftercare, discharge or
supervision in the community.37
Missouri provides:
[I]n the correctional treatment applied to each inmate, reformation
of the inmate, his social and moral improvement, and his rehabili-
tation toward useful, productive and law abiding citizenship shall
be guiding factors and aims.38
New York provides:
1. The commissioner shall establish program and classification
procedures designed to assure the complete study of the background
36 334 F.2d at 516.
37 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 6501 (Supp. 1968).
38 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 216.090 (1) (1962).
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and condition of each inmate in the care or custody of the depart-
ment and the assignment of such inmate to a program that is most
likely to be useful in assisting him to refrain from future violations
of the law. Such procedures shall be incorporated into the rules
and regulations of the department and shall require among other
things: consideration of the physical, mental and emotional con-
dition of the inmate; consideration of his educational and vocational
needs; consideration of the danger he presents to the community
or to other inmates; the recording of continuous case histories in-
cluding notations as to apparent success or failure of treatment
employed; and periodic review of case histories and treatment
methods used.3 9
North Carolina provides:
[TIhe Commission shall classify the facilities of the state prison
system and develop a variety of programs so as to permit proper
segregation and treatment of prisoners according to the nature of
the offenses committed, and the character and mental condition
of the prisoners, and such other factors as should be considered
in providing an individualized system of discipline, care, and cor-
rectional treatment of persons committed to the Department.40
Nebraska provides:
The Director of Corrections shall:
(3) Establish and administer policies and programs for the opera-
tion of the facilities in the division and for the custody, control,
safety, correction and rehabilitation of persons committed to the
division.41
Most states express a similar rehabilitative purpose in their sta-
tutes.
42
-39 N. Y. CoRPRc. LAws § 137 (McKinney 1970).
40 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 148-36 (Supp. 1969).
41 NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-173 (3) (Supp. 1969).
42 Other statutes which contain language sufficient to support a right
to treatment are: ALAsKA STAT. § 33.30.020 (1962); ARiz. RaV. STAT.
AmN. § 41-1604A(2) (Supp. 1969); CAL. WELT. & INST'NS CODE § 3305
(West 1966); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-11-3 (1963); CoN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 18-102 (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. AwNuT. § 944.03 (Supp. 1970);
GA. CODE AqN. § 77-319 (1964); HAwAII REv. LAWS § 355.1 (1968);
IDAHO CODE AwN. § 20-701 (1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-123 (1956);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 218.97 (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2226 (1964);
Ky. Rnv. STAT. § 197.065 (1962); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-854 (1967);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 1291 (1964); Mnb. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
679 (1957); MAss. GEu. LAws ANN. ch. 125, § App. 1-2 (1958); MiNW.
STAT. ANN. § 241.29 (Supp. 1970); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7921 (Supp.
1966); MONT. REV. CODE ANx. § 95-2308 (1969); NEv. REv. STAT. §
215.020 (1967); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 622-A:2 (1969); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 421.284 (1969); PA. STAT. tit. 61, § 932 (1964); R. L GEN. LAWS
AN. § 13-11-2 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-63-1 (Supp. 1969); VT.
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Many states have entered into either the Western 8 or New Eng-
land Interstate Compacts." These compacts are enacted by the
legislatures of the states pursuant to the same procedures as ordi-
nary statutes and once enacted have a force even superior to sta-
tutes. 45 The compacts are nearly the same, both providing for the
interstate transfer of prisoners to member states having more suit-
able facilities for the type of treatment required. Both compacts
state the policy of all the member states to be to provide high
quality programs and facilities for the confinement, treatment, and
rehabilitation of various types of offenders.
4 6
The language of these acts is no more vague or equivocal than
those upon which a right to treatment has already been based.47
There are, of course, some states in which rehabilitation is not
stated as a governing purpose. These occurrences, however, are as
easily attributable to a failure to revise statutes in accordance with
prevailing norms and standards as they are to any deliberate
choice of vindictive punishment over rehabilitation. Where lang-
uage expressive of rehabilitative intent does not exist it should be
drafted and until it is the statutes which authorize a correctional
system should be construed in pari materia with other statutes of
STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 1401 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-13-1 (1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.043 (Supp. 1970); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-408
(1957).
43 The Western Interstate Corrections Compact has been adopted by
Alaska, California, Colorado, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. THE COuNcnL
or STATE GOVERNMENTS, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 50
(1966).
44 The New England Interstate Corrections Compact has been adopted
by Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Vermont. See McGrath, The New England Interstate Corrections Com-
pact, 38 STATE GOV'T 16 (1965).
45 They are superior in that once lawfully entered into the highest court
of any member state may not make an interpretation which would
nullify an obligation of a member state. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22
(1951).
46 The language of the Western Compact is representative of both: "The
party states desiring by common action to improve their institutional
facilities and provide programs of sufficiently high quality for the
confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders,
declare that it is the policy of each of the party states to provide such
facilities and programs on a basis of co-operation with one another,
thereby serving the best interest of such offenders and of society."
NEv. REv. STAT. § 215.020 (1967).
47 See notes 18 and 29 and accompanying text supra.
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the state concerning the same subject matter, such as those con-
cerning parole and probation.4 8
The statutory language demonstrates that the enacting legisla-
tures recognized the purpose of the prison system to be reformation
of the individual and the protection of society. The very name "De-
partment of Corrections" under which most prison systems are
organized is illustrative of that intent. Although not every state has
a statute stating that rehabilitation and reformation are the goals
of the correctional system, no state has a statute saying that re-
habilitation is not the desired goal or that vindictive punishment
is. Even a cursory glance at correctional laws would indicate that
punishment inflicted without a view towards reformation is in
conflict with the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society.49
IV. ADVANTAGES OF A STATUTORY RIGHT
Sostre v. Rockefeller,0 a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 198351
demonstrates the inherent problems of federal intervention in a
48 There is no reason why the legislative purpose behind placing an
offender in prison should be different from that which lies behind
probation and parole, which has uniformly been the reformation of
the individual and his return to society.
49 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
50 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). After this comment was written
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of
the trial court but at the same time modified it in several important
respects. The court reversed the award of punitive damages and also
the holding of the trial court that confinement in punitive segregation
for more than 15 days constituted cruel and unusual punishment per
se. Also reversed was the requirement that prison administrators
submit rules to govern future disciplinary proceedings on the grounds
that the question whether New York prisons systematically violate
due process was not presented in the lower court. The court did warn
administrators of any arbitrary or capricious punishment. "We would
not likely condone the absence of such basic safeguards against arbi-
trariness as adequate notice, an opportunity to reply to charges lodged
against him and a reasonable investigation into the relevant facts,
at least in cases of substantial discipline." See N.Y. Times, February
25, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
81 "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within thejurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceed-
ing for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). A similarly worded section
vests original jurisdiction over such actions in the district courts. 28
U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1964). For an exhaustive article on the uses of sec-
tion 1983 by prisoners, see Note, Prisoner's Rights Under Section 1983,
57 GEo. L.J. 1270 (1969).
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state institutional framework. Martin Sostre was a Black Muslim
activist who had been sentenced to thirty to forty years for a nar-
cotics conviction. He had previously served twelve years in prison;
four of those years were spent in solitary confinement. During his
prior sentences Sostre had successfully secured certain unrestricted
religious liberties for Black Muslim prisoners. 52 On the day of his
arrival at Attica prison he was transferred by the Deputy Warden
to Green Haven prison based on what the Deputy Warden regarded
as the best interests of the inmate and of the state. Sostre came
into immediate conflict with prison administrators. He was placed
in solitary confinement for his attempts to mail handwritten mo-
tions to the court and for his refusal to explain the letters R.N.A.
in a letter he wrote. Sostre was subjected to 372 days in solitary
confinement. During that time only one other prisoner was placed
in the same group of cells. 53 Sostre remained in his cell twenty-
four hours per day.5 4 Most important, Sostre was not permitted to
use the prison library, read newspapers, see movies or attend
school and training programs. The court held that prolonged soli-
tary confinement beyond fifteen days was needlessly degrading
and dangerous to the maintenance of sanity.55
It was found that Sostre had been subjected to cruel and un-
usual punishment, denied procedural due process, denied access
to the courts and public officials and wrongfully denied his freedom
of political expression. He was awarded a total of $13,020 compen-
satory and punitive damages.56 The court enjoined administrators
from placing Sostre in solitary or revoking his good time credit
without extending full due process privileges to him.5 7 Prison ad-
52 See Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961) and Sostre v.
McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
53 One prisoner brought to solitary and placed in another group of cells
commited suicide the next day. 312 F. Supp. at 868.
54 Sostre was allowed one hour per day recreation in a small completely
enclosed yard, but he refused this privilege since it was conditioned
upon a mandatory strip frisk including a rectal examination. Id. at
868.
55 Id. The time limitation of fifteen days was removed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit on appeal. See note 50 supra.
56 Id. at 885. The recovery was divided into $9,300 compensatory and
$3,720 punitive damages; however, on appeal the award of punitive
damages was reversed. See note 50 supra.
57 After Sostre was released from solitary confinement he was again dis-
ciplined for having dust on his cell bars. Later he was disciplined for
possessing inflammatory racial literature which consisted of his own
hand written articles, containing excerpts from magazines and news-
papers in general circulation around the prison and a list of names
from Esquire magazine. Subsequently administrators were enjoined
from placing him in solitary or depriving him of good time credit
without (1) giving him written notice of any charges made against
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ministrators were further required to submit proposed rules and
regulations governing future disciplinary proceedings for approval
where the possible punishments included punitive segregation or
loss of good time.5 8
While Sostre was undoubtedly subjected to severe infringement
of his constitutional rights, the most harmful aspect of his treat-
ment was that he was denied thirteen months' training or possible
rehabilitation. The most shocking fact in the entire case is that
the warden was able to deny a prisoner these privileges without
once being compelled to justify his decision.
The decision in Sostre met with immediate opposition from
prison administrators. Officials asserted that guards were afraid
to discipline prisoners for fear of being sued for damages, and that
the prisoners resented Sostre being singled out for what they re-
garded as special privileges. The warden of the prison stated that
things were going so badly that the prison might have to be shut
down. 9 No doubt much of the administrative reaction was designed
to create a favorable climate for review of the decision. It is pos-
sible, however, that the administrative belligerence evidenced in
New York, at what was regarded as unwarranted federal interfer-
ence, is not unlike the reaction which occurred after the school
desegregation and legislative reapportionment cases.6 0 Once con-
stitutional mandates have been imposed on a state institution such
as a school or prison the actual process of reformation is dependent
upon funds which can only be provided by the state legislature.
Legislatures, in turn, are notably reluctant to appropriate money
to effectuate federal court orders. It is true that redressing infringe-
ments of First or Eighth Amendment rights does not require the
cooperation of state government, but any attempt to reform a
prison system to provide programs of training and rehabilitation
inevitably would.61 The enforcement of state statutes conferring a
him, citing the written rule or regulation he had violated; (2) grant-
ing him an impartial hearing before a disinterested official where he
would be entitled to cross examine witnesses and present witnesses on
his own behalf; (3) granting him the right to counsel or to appoint
a counsel substitute; (4) giving him in writing the decision of the
hearing officer reciting the evidence and reasons upon which the
decision and punishment were based. Id. at 884.
58 Id. The Court of Appeals reversed this portion of the decision. See
note 50 supra.
59 N. Y. Times, June 13, 1970, at 39, col 3.
60 See Gellhorn, Decade of Desegregation-Retrospect and Prospect, 9
UTAH L. REv. 3, 5 (1964).
61 See Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (inhuman cell
conditions prohibited); Hancock v. Avery, 3(11 F. Supp. 786 (M.D.
Tenn. 1969) (conditions of cells held to violate Eighth Amendment);
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right to treatment would have the advantage of forcing state legis-
latures to support their own announced aims and goals and would
avoid the feeling of interference in state affairs which federal
intervention would appear to cause.
Failure to provide adequate treatment occurs both on an indi-
vidual and on a massive scale, as is demonstrated by a recent
prisoner class action brought in a federal court. A United States
District Court decision in Holt v. Sarver62 culminated several years
of extensive litigation3 by declaring that confinement in the Ar-
kansas prison system constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The atrocities committed
in Arkansas under the authority of prison administrators are too
numerous for an extended recital. 4 The actual physical control of
the prison, both from a clerical aspect and from the standpoint of
security, was in the hands of trustees. Armed trustee guards had
absolute power of life or death over prisoners, which was demon-
strated by the discovery of numerous unmarked graves in the prison
yard. Inmates were housed in barracks with rows of beds side by
side. It was common practice for inmates to creep or crawl among
the beds in order that they might stab an enemy or subject one of
the weaker prisoners to homosexual abuse.6 5 Irrespective of the
physical abuses, which were commonplace, the worst feature of
the system was that there was no attempt to provide any sort of
rehabilitation. The court stated: "In Act 50 of 1968 the Legislature
recognized the important place of training and rehabilitation in the
Arkansas penal program and directed the Department of Correc-
tions to initiate and prosecute such a program."66 The statute the
court was referring to states:
The purpose of this Act is to establish a Department of Correction
to assume the custody, control and management of the State Pen-
itentiary; to execute the orders of the Criminal courts of the State
Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (conditions
of strip cells enjoined, pictured at 685). These cases eliminated certain
harsh physical conditions but provided little guidance as to what
should be the appropriate standards of treatment.
62 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825
(E.D. Ark. 1969) (connected case).
63 See Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969); Jackson v.
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), rev'g 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark.
1967) (use of strap enjoined); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683,
689 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (use of strap disallowed except if inflicted dis-
passionately and by a responsible person).
64 The full story of the Arkansas prison scandal is recited in MuRToN
& HYAms, ACcoMPLIcEs TO THE CRIME (1969).
65 309 F. Supp. at 376.
66 Id. at 378.
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of Arkansas, and, to provide for the custody, treatment, rehabilita-
tion and restoration of adult offenders as useful, law abiding citi-
zens within the community.67
Another section of the statute states: "Persons committed to the
institutional care of the Department shall be dealt with humanely
with efforts directed to their rehabilitation. 68
The court recognized that nothing had been done. Aptitude tests
were given but the results were disregarded. The most significant
attempt at reformation was forced labor in the fields. The court
recognized that failure to provide rehabilitation, in addition to
violating express legislative direction, was harmful to the interests
of society:
Since it costs money to confine convicts, more than many tax-
payers realize, it would seem to be in the enlightened self-interest
of all states to try to rehabilitate their convicts, as the Arkansas
Legislature and Respondents have recognized.69
The court was not willing to find the system unconstitutional on
the grounds of failure to provide treatment, but was content to de-
clare the system unconstitutional for its purely physical aspects,
the lack of guards, sanitary conditions, and assaults upon inmates.
As enlightened as the opinion was, the court failed to realize that
the interests of society would not be measurably improved by more
guards, clean sheets, and shiny new cells. Society has a right to
demand that prisoners be released from prison benefited by their
confinement and less dangerous to the public. The court found that:
It can be said safely that except in a very, very few and unusual
cases confinement in the Arkansas State Penitentiary today is the
opposite of beneficial. As a generality it may be stated that few
individuals come out of it better men for their experience; most
come out as bad as they went in, or worse.7 0
It should be noted that in the Holt case the legislature had en-
acted legislation providing that each prisoner was to be given ade-
quate rehabilitative treatment.71 The -court in Holt expressly re-
cognized that new legislation had been enacted, based on the self-
interest of the state, which provided for the rehabilitation of prison-
ers.72 Instead of requiring rehabilitative opportunities for the
prisoners, however, the court was forced to be content to require
plans to eliminate the harsh physical conditions. Based on the
jurisdiction of the federal court, it could fashion remedies only on
67 ARx. STAT. ANN. § 46-100 (Supp. 1969).
68 Id. § 46-116.
69 309 F. Supp. at 379.
70, Id.
71 Note 67 and accompanying text supra.
72 Note 69 and acc oinpanying text supra. :
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the constitutional claim of cruel and unusual punishment which
was brought before it. Both the prisoners and society had a clear
statutory right to make certain that adequate rehabilitative treat-
ment was afforded all prisoners. A right to treatment was present
but not enforced since jurisdiction was based on the federal Con-
stitutional question.
V. ENFORCEMENT OF THE STATUTORY
RIGHT TO TREATMENT
The right to treatment as it presently exists in cases involving
the mentally ill, juveniles, and defective delinquents cannot be
said to be an effective weapon against denials of adequate treat-
ment. It probably can be analyzed as an attempt to provide a
remedy through habeas corpus proceedings to what would previ-
ously have been called a right without a remedy. Habeas corpus,
however, is at best inadequate since it provides only for release.
What the petitioner is asking for is the type of treatment which
he is authorized by statute to receive. Habeas corpus is a remedy
only in the sense that release of the petitioner can be used as a
threat to obtain treatment. It is very doubtful that a court would
ever release a mentally ill person, or for that matter a prisoner,
since to do so would be a threat to the public. The purpose of this
comment is to suggest a means of enforcing the right to treatment
by both the prisoner and the public which would give meaning to
what would otherwise be useless acts of oratory by state legis-
latures.
A. STATE ADusnsTRATrvE PRocEDURE AcTS
Almost every state has enacted some type of administrative
procedure act. Many have enacted the Revised Model State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.73 The major principles of these acts
require that each agency of state government adopt essential pro-
cedural rules, and that all rule making, procedural and substantive,
be accompanied by notice to interested persons with an opportunity
to submit views or information. 74 In addition they provide for re-
view of administrative orders and the correction of administrative
errors.
73 Legislation in about 25 states has been founded to a greater or lesser
extent on either the original Model Act of 1946 or the Revised Model
Act of 1961. They are Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin.
74 2 F. CooPER, STATE ADIfVmnlSTRATVE LAw 881 (1965).
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Whatever name is given to the Division of Corrections or Penal
Institutions it is clearly an administrative agency of the state and
falls under the provisions of the act unless specifically excluded.75
Using the Revised Model Act as a guide, several conclusions can
be made which bear on making the right to treatment enforce-
able.76 First, as an agency of the state the Division of Corrections
is required, as a rule, to adopt a description of its organization stat-
ing the method of its operation and methods whereby the public
may obtain information, and make available for public inspection
all rules and other written statements of policy, as well as all final
orders, decisions, and opinions.77 The act further provides:
(b) No agency rule, order, or decision is valid or effective against
any person or party, nor may it be invoked by the agency for
any purpose, until it has been made available for public inspection
as herein required .... 78
It may be that the Division of Corrections simply ignores these or
similar provisions believing that correctional rules and decisions
do not affect the public. However, it is reasonably safe to assume
that many citizens are as concerned with crime as with decisions
by the highway department or public power commission. If the
provisions of the Act are not observed the Act provides a remedy
through declaratory judgment in state district court which may
be brought by any person whose "legal rights or privileges" are
interfered with.70 If the Division of Corrections follows the guide-
lines of the Administrative Procedure Act but ignores the statutory
language requiring adequate treatment and rehabilitative oppor-
tunity for prisoners, provision is made for a declaratory judgment
within the agency:
Each agency shall provide by rule for the filing and prompt dis-
position of petitions for declaratory rulings as to the applicability
of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the agency.
Rulings disposing of petitions have the same status as agency de-
cisions or orders in contested cases.80
One of the important aspects of enforcing the right to treat-
ment under administrative procedure acts is that hearings are
75 RvisED MODEL STATE ADmInasTRATxVE PROCEDuRE ACT § 1, Comment
(1961) [hereinafter cited as MODEL AcT].
76 The Model Act is used since the principles embodied by it are of al-
most universal applicability and because analysis of individual state
administrative procedure acts would be beyond the scope of this com-
ment. Reference should be made to the provisions of each state act
where the Model Act has not been adopted.
77 MODE. ACT § 2, Comment.
78 Id. § 2 (b).
79 Id. § 7.
80 Id. § 8 (emphasis added).
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bound by the rules of evidence, and the basis of decisions in con-
tested cases must be in writing or stated in the record."' If after
exhaustion of all administrative remedies a decision is still not
satisfactory, provision is made in the Revised Model Act for judicial
review: "(a) A person who has exhausted all administrative rem-
edies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final
decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this
Act ...."8
Provision is made in the Act for the filing of a petition for
review in the district court of the county designated by the
statute.8 Review of administrative decisions is limited to tradi-
tional areas. The court is not authorized to substitute its discretion
for that of the agency; however, the court may reverse or modify
the decision of the agency if substantial rights of the appellant
have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, infer-
ences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) affected by other error of law;
(5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and sub-
stantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion
or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.8 4
There are, of course, many different administrative procedure
acts, of which the Revised Model State Act is only one. However,
most of the provisions of key significance to the right to treatment
are present in some form or another. The purpose of any adminis-
trative procedure act is essentially the same as the right to treat-
ment, that is, to compel compliance with statutory directives and
to provide aggrieved parties with administrative due process and
judicial review.
B. ALTERNATIE MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT-STANDING TO SUE
State administrative procedure acts are by no means the only
available means of enforcing the right to treatment. Unlike the
federal courts, many state courts freely recognize the rights of
those described as citizens, residents, or taxpayers to challenge
81 Id. § 12.
s2 Id. § 15(a).
83 Id. § 15 (b).
84 Id. § 15 (g).
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administrative action.88 The Court of Appeals of New York has held
that a person could challenge a license issued to a seller of news-
papers based on the fact that the plaintiff was a citizen and there-
fore needed no special interest.8 6 Decisions to the same effect can be
found in New Jersey, 87 Massachusetts,88 Minnesota,89 California,"
Nebraska,91 and many other states.92 In these states it would appear
that failure to provide adequate treatment could be challenged
completely apart from administrative procedure acts by seeking
a writ of mandamus.
Another means which could be utilized to enforce the right to
treatment is the taxpayer suit. The number of states which allow
taxpayer suits to challenge the legality of official conduct is in a
constant state of flux. A safe statement seems to be that most states
allow such suits where a taxpayer has a pecuniary interest in the
public expenditure and a few allow them even without a direct
pecuniary interest, based on the concept of public action. 3 More
significant perhaps, only New York appears to be totally opposed
to allowing suits by state taxpayers to challenge state expendi-
tures. Thus, while a direct pecuniary interest may be necessary
in most states, there are some states in which citizen-mandamus or
taxpayer suits can be an effective weapon to enforce the right to
treatment. Citizen-mandamus and taxpayer suits suffer from an in-
s8 See K. DAVIs, ADwM STRATI LAw TREATMs § 22.10 (1958). The
question of whether a prisoner qualifies as a citizen of the state, a
resident, or a taxpayer is dependent upon the requirements of each
state and the civil disabilities imposed on the prisoner. See generally
Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REV. 403 (1967). These
alternative means of enforcement by nonprisoners are a means by
which a private citizen can gain standing to sue correctional admin-
istrators without resorting to administrative procedure acts.
86 People ex rel. Pumpyansky v. Keating, 168 N.Y. 390, 61 N.E. 637 (Ct.
App. 1901).
87 Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332 (1879).
88 Nichols v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 311 Mass. 125, 40 N.E.2d
275 (1942).
89 State v. Weld, 39 Minn. 426, 40 N.W. 561 (1888).
90 Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal. 2d 351, 196 P.2d 562 (1948).
91 Lynch v. City of Omaha, 153 Neb. 147, 43 N.W.2d 589 (1950); Noble
v. City of Lincoln, 153 Neb. 79, 43 N.W.2d 578 (1950); Rein v. John-
son, 149 Neb. 67, 30 N.W.2d 548 (1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814(1948). All of these cases grant taxpayers the right to sue despite a
failure to show any special interest.
92 See, e.g., Lien v. Northwestern Eng'r Co., 74 S.D. 476, 54 N.W.2d 472
(1952); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951). See also
Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAv.
L. REv. 1265 (1961).
93 An exhaustive list of state cases through 1965 is cited in 3 K. DAvis,
supra note 85, § 22.10 n.85 (Supp. 1965).
94 Id.
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herent weakness, however, since such suits may not be effective as
a means of compelling a state to spend money to rehabilitate pris-
oners. These suits would seem limited to prohibiting the correc-
tional system from operating contrary to law. Suits under state ad-
ministrative procedure acts would appear to be the best means by
which to force administrators to adopt operating procedures and
rules implementing a right to treatment with existing appropia-
tions.
C. STANDING TO SUE UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACTS
Before suit can be brought under a state administrative pro-
cedure act the party commencing the action must have standing
to sue. The problem of standing could easily be overcome by draft-
ing new legislation conferring standing upon interested citizens to
sue'to enforce a right to treatment for prisoners.9 5 The most per-
suasive argument for granting public interest standing would seem
to be that any statute which exists for the protection of society
affects the entire public directly and thus all members of the public
should be able to enforce the statute. Public interest standing is
not the Pandora's box some might think. The commencement of a
lawsuit against public officials or agencies is hardly a frivolous
matter likely to be commenced by anyone who is not sincere in
believing that the directives of a statute are not being carried out.
The law of standing, however, has always been opposed to allow-
ing members of the public to sue to enforce public rights. Historic-
ally, courts have felt that a valid case or controversy could not
be presented unless the complaining party had suffered harm of a
kind different from that suffered by other members of the public.9 6
The requirement of standing is met in the Revised Model Act by
the provision that only a person aggrieved may seek judicial re-
view of a contested case97
It would seem too obvious for debate that the prisoner himself
is a party aggrieved by correctional rules or their absence or by
abuse of administrative discretion in failing to provide adequate
treatment. The prisoner is not necessarily deprived of his right to
take advantage of the legal process because of the fact of imprison-
95 Michigan recently enacted a bill giving the individual citizen the
right to sue private industry or public agencies for injuring the en-
vironment. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1970, at 21, col. 1.
96 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 821C (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970)
expresses a widely adopted view on standing: "For a public nuisance
there is liability in tort only to those who have suffered harm of a
kind different from that suffered by other members of the public
exercising the public right."
97 MoDEL AcT § 15 (a).
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ment,98 but at the same time his indigency and inability to obtain
adequate legal assistance make him a very ineffective champion of
the right to treatment.9 In addition, the right of the public to
compel prisoner rehabilitation should not be made dependent on
the willingness of a prisoner to seek rehabilitation. The sole desire
of the prisoner may be to extricate himself from the prison environ-
ment. It would appear that if effective enforcement of the right to
treatment rests with the public it must be based on public interest
standing or the right to act as a "private attorney general"'00 to
enforce a public right.
In order to assert the rights of the public, the party bringing
suit must have standing himself. Traditionally, only those whose
interests were protected by the statute in question or those whose
"legal rights" or "interests" were invaded had standing to challenge
an administrative decision.10' A more liberal test of standing had
been adopted in Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders
Brothers Radio Station.102 In that case a radio station challenged
the grant of a construction permit to a competing station. The court
stated that economic injury was not, in and of itself and apart from
considerations of public convenience, interest, or necessity, suffi-
cient to confer standing. But it added:
[Congress] may have been of the opinion that one likely to be
financially injured by the issue of a license would be the only per-
son having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the
appellate court errors of law in the action of the Commission in
granting the license. It is within the power of Congress to confer
such standing to prosecute an appeal
98 See Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 887 (1945): "A prisoner retains all rights of an ordinary
citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from
him by law."
99 The problem of providing legal services for prisoners is exhaustively
covered by Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for
Legal Services in the Criminal Correctional Process, 18 U. KAN. L.
Rsv. 493 (1970).
100 The term "private attorney general" is attributable to the opinion of
Judge Frank in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
1.01 See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 7 (1968); Stark v.
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944); Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306
U.S. 118 (1939); Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924). See Note,
Administrative Law-Standing to Challenge Admininstrative Actions
-Anyone Arguably Protected by Statute May Sue, 23 VAxD. L. Rv.
814 (1970).
102 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
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We hold, therefore, that the respondent had the requisite stand-
ing to appeal and to raise, in the court below, any relevant ques-
tion of law in respect of the order of the Commission.10
The Sanders Brothers case has been interpreted to mean that any-
one aggrieved or injured in fact has the requisite standing under
an administrative procedure act. 04 Among those who have been
found to be aggrieved in fact are competitors, 10 5 consumers, 06 and
groups organized by persons showing a special interest in a par-
ticular area of administrative action.'
0 7
A recent Supreme Court case appears to have adopted both the
tests of "aggrieved in fact" and "member of a class protected by
statute." In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp,0 8 the Court stated that the issue of standing was
to be decided by two inquiries. First, the question must be asked
"whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused
him injury in fact, economic or otherwise."'09 The second question
is "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant
is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."" 0 The Court
rejected the "legal interest" test as going to the merits rather than
the issue of standing. Thus, a somewhat broadened concept of
standing has emerged. Anyone aggrieved in fact and arguably with-
in the zone of interests protected by the statute has standing to sue.
Included among those aggrieved in fact are special interest groups.
103 Id. at 477 (footnote omitted).
104 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 85, § 22.04.
105 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
108 Office of Comm. of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
107 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d
Cir. 1965) (conservation group held to have standing): "In order to
insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately protect
the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational
aspects of power development, those who by their activities and con-
duct have exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be held
to be in the class of aggrieved parties .... ." See also Note, Admin-
istrative Law-Expansion of "Public Interest" Standing, 45 N.C.L. Rsv.
998 (1967).
108 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The basis of standing was the economic loss suf-
fered by Data Processing when the Comptroller of the Currency ruled
that national banks could make data processing services available
to other banks and their customers. A companion case, Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), held that tenant farmers under the Up-
land Cotton Program had standing to challenge the validity of amend-
ed regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture.
109 397 U.S. at 152.
110 Id. at 153.
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The ramifications of Data Processing are relevant to the right
to treatment to the extent that state courts interpret state adminis-
trative procedure acts in the same way as the federal act. If that
happens, several classes of people would appear to have standing
to sue to enforce a right to treatment for prisoners under state ad-
ministrative procedure acts. Persons aggrieved in fact, besides the
prisoner, might be the prisoner's family, which is dependent upon
him for support and maintenance. The police might be considered
aggrieved in fact since they must deal directly with the prisoner
if he is not rehabilitated. Those employers who wish to employ ex-
offenders may be aggrieved by the fact that the offenders were not
taught any useful skill or trade while in prison. Arguably, all of
these people might also be considered to be within the protection
of the statutes which require that treatment be afforded prisoners.
Perhaps the most significant group of persons who appear to
have standing would be those organized especially to seek rehabili-
tation of prisoners. Like conservation groups, which have been
held to have standing to assert the rights of the public, prisoner
rehabilitation groups likewise can be expected to provide the con-
crete adverseness necessary for a case or controversy. Foremost
among these groups would appear to be the groups which com-
prise the American Correctional Association."- Certainly ex-of-
fender groups across the country and groups of concerned citizens
organized in good faith to promote prisoner rehabilitation would
also be entitled to standing. All of these groups meet the test of
being aggrieved in fact. They also meet the test of arguably being
within the zone of interests protected by the statute. It would ap-
pear that if a right to treatment is to become effectual its enforce-
ment would fall upon these groups. The right of those who have
standing to assert the rights of the public as well as their own has
been stated by the Supreme Court: "That a court is called upon
to enforce public rights and not the interests of private property
does not diminish its power to protect such rights.... [T]he rights
to be vindicated are those of the public and not of private liti-
gants.""2
M11 The American Correctional Association is a composition of fourteen
affiliated bodies, each of which would likewise have standing. Repre-
sentative of these organizations are the American Correctional Chap-
lains Association, Association of Correctional Psychologists, Interna-
tional Half Way House Association, The Salvation Army, and The
Women's Correctional Association. 32 Am. J. oF Commucmoi 3 (May-
June 1970).1 2 Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14-15 (1942).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Neither the police nor the courts have the opportunity to deal
with the problems of the criminal offender in any sort of a correc-
tive manner. Whether that opportunity is taken advantage of when
the offender enters a correctional institution should be of great
concern to the public. Correctional systems should have as their
main purpose the protection of society through the rehabilitation
of offenders. If retribution is substituted for reformation it is so-
ciety as well as the prisoner who suffers. The right to treatment
has been an effective instrument in securing for the mentally ill,
sexual psychopaths, and juveniles the type of treatment which will
enable them to safely rejoin society.
The language of rehabilitative intent which is expressed in
broad terms in our state statutes indicates that society, through
their elected representatives, has recognized that treatment and
not physical suffering is the goal of confinement. If state courts
are unable to deal with serious problems of public concern, history
shows that federal courts will assume the responsibility. Federal
intervention suffers from a serious handicap when it attempts re-
form of state institutional framework since state institutions must
rely on state legislatures for their successful continuation. An en-
forceable right to treatment on a state level would avoid much of
the legislative reluctance to act which often arises when federal
courts attempt to enforce constitutional mandates.
If society is to benefit from a right to treatment it must become
an enforceable right of the public as well as the prisoner. State
habeas corpus is not an adequate remedy since total release of the
prisoner is not a realistic solution. Prison administrators must be
compelled to comply with the statutory language of treatment and
rehabilitation through suits brought under state administrative
procedure acts, citizen-mandamus, or taxpayer suits. Since the right
to treatment stems from statutory directives designed to protect
society as well as to provide treatment for prisoners, it should be
enforceable by either the prisoners themselves or by interested
members of the public. The most effective weapon to enforce the
right to treatment would be suits under state administrative pro-
cedure acts to compel compliance with correctional statutes and
to limit the discretion of prison administrators. Like all public
officials, prison administrators are vested with a public trust. Ad-
ministrative procedure acts exist to insure that administrators
remain responsive to the commands of the public and do not violate
that trust. The right to treatment, properly enforced, can insure
that the field of corrections will not become insulated from the
view of the public and that the opportunity to rehabilitate criminal
offenders will not be lost. James A. Snowden '72
